Obergefell, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Fulton, and Public-Private Partnerships: Unleashing v. Harnessing \u27Armies of Compassion\u27 2.0? by McClain, Linda C.
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2021 
Obergefell, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Fulton, and Public-Private 
Partnerships: Unleashing v. Harnessing 'Armies of Compassion' 
2.0? 
Linda C. McClain 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 








OBERGEFELL, MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, 
FULTON, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS:  UNLEASHING V. 





Boston University School of Law 
Research Paper Series No. 21-25 
 
 
September 17, 2021 
 
 
Linda C. McClain 








Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925800
1 
 
Obergefell, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Fulton, and Public-Private Partnerships:  Unleashing v. 
Harnessing “Armies of Compassion” 2.0?   
(final draft will appear in Family Court Review symposium on Fulton) 
Linda C. McClain* 
Part I. Introduction 
 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia presents a new iteration of a by-now familiar 
constitutional claim: recognizing civil marriage equality—the right of persons to marry 
regardless of gender—inevitably and sharply conflicts with the religious liberty of persons and 
religious institutions who sincerely believe that marriage is the union of one man and one 
woman. The context in Fulton was a government contract with a religious non-profit (CSS) to 
provide foster care services: when that contract – incorporating the Fair Practices Act, a local 
antidiscrimination law – prohibited CSS from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation 
(among other grounds), did CSS’s religious liberty require the City of Philadelphia to exempt it 
from that requirement instead of cancelling the contract once it learned that CSS would not 
certify same-sex couples as foster parents because of the Catholic Church’s beliefs about 
marriage?1 
While the Supreme Court may have “surprised every Court watcher with a unanimous 
decision in favor of” Sharonell Fulton (and other foster parents) and Catholic Social Services 
(CSS),2 that unanimity on the judgment, not on Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, did not signal 
                                                          
* Robert Kent Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I presented an earlier version of this article at 
the symposium, Fulton, Faith, Families, and Foster Care, sponsored by the University of Virginia School of Law, 
Family Law Center and am grateful to participants for comments. Many thanks to my former research assistant 
Kaela Dunn and current assistants Amanda Baird and MacKenzie Freed for valuable research on this article. 
Disclosure:  I joined the amicus brief submitted in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia by Legal Scholars in Support of 
Equality in Support of Respondents and authored by Professor Kyle Velte. 
1 See Fulton v. Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 146-149 (3rd Cir. 2019), rev’d, 593 U.S. __ (2021) (slip. op.). 
2 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Radical Uncertainty of Free Exercise Principles: A Comment on Fulton v. 
City of Philadelphia, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, SUPREME COURT REVIEW (5th ed., 2020-21), available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3888375. 
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consensus on the Court over how best to resolve the evident conflicts raised by such public-
private partnerships.3 To the contrary. Roberts’ narrow (and, arguably, “questionable”4) basis for 
holding that Philadelphia violated CSS’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion—that 
Philadelphia’s foster care contract lacked “general applicability” because it permitted an 
administrator to grant exceptions “in his/her sole discretion”—avoided several larger questions 
about the respective scope of religious liberty and of antidiscrimination law when a religious 
entity partners with government to provide a social service.5  
Perhaps the largest and most commented upon of those avoided questions was whether 
the Court should reconsider and overrule its controversial precedent, Employment Division v. 
Smith, as CSS and many of its amici urged the Court to do. Smith, they argued, insufficiently 
protects First Amendment rights like those alleged by CSS; instead, government should satisfy a 
compelling interest standard before it can burden the free exercise of religion. Justices Alito, 
Gorsuch, and Thomas emphatically answered that question yes, and castigated Roberts for not 
overruling Smith; however, neither Roberts and the two other conservatives justices nor the three 
remaining liberal justices were ready to do so, at least not yet.6  
This article focuses on other unaddressed, significant questions in Fulton, including the 
precedential force and implications of the Court’s earlier decisions in Obergefell v. Hodges and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission on a post-Kennedy and post-
Ginsburg Court with a 6-3 conservative majority. As elaborated below, those cases addressed 
                                                          
3 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __ (2021) (slip. op.). Five members of the Court—Justices Barrett, Breyer, 
Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Sotomayor—joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. Barrett wrote a brief concurrence 
(joined by Justices Kavanaugh and, in part, by Breyer). Three of the conservative justices, Justices Alito, Gorsuch, 
and Thomas, concurred only in the judgment; Alito wrote a lengthy concurrence (joined by Thomas and Gorsuch) 
and Gorsuch wrote a concurrence (joined by Alito and Thomas).    
4 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 3. 
5 Fulton, 593 U.S. __,  slip op. at 5-10.  
6 Roberts stated that “we need not revisit [Smith] here” because the instant case “falls outside Smith.” Id. at 5.  
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earlier iterations of the evident conflict between marriage equality—and LBGTQ equality more 
broadly—and First Amendment claims. I will argue that the Court’s opinion in Fulton also did 
not engage with analogies that were powerful, pervasive, and contested in those earlier cases:  
the analogy between discrimination on the basis of race and discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and the analogy between religious opposition to interracial marriage, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, to same-sex marriage. Even so, those analogies featured in the Fulton briefs 
and in the justices’ questioning during the oral argument.  Notably, a rejection of that analogy 
appeared in Justice Alito’s Fulton concurrence, where he argued that “lumping those [like CSS] 
who hold traditional beliefs about marriage together with racial bigots is insulting to those who 
retain such beliefs,” as well as contrary both to the majority’s “commitment” in Obergefell and 
to Masterpiece Cakeshop.7 Strikingly, Justice Alito’s rhetoric of racial bigotry echoes his earlier 
dissents in those very cases he now enlists. This article illustrates the different ways in which the 
parties and their amici enlisted or rejected the race analogy. 
Fulton also leaves unanswered questions about the parameters of public-private 
partnerships like those between the City of Philadelphia and CSS and of how different 
conceptions of pluralism and of the place of religion in the public square shape competing views 
of those parameters. Those conceptions, evident in briefs by the parties and their amici, shape 
arguments about whether a government contract properly insists upon adherence to public values 
like nondiscrimination in providing services or whether pluralism requires that private actors – 
even when contracting with government – be free to act on their beliefs and be exempt from such 
nondiscrimination norms. I will argue that it may be productive and illuminating to compare 
these present-day debates over pluralism and public-private partnerships with controversies 
                                                          
7 Id. at 75 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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arising twenty years earlier over the faith-based initiative launched by President George W. 
Bush. That initiative also rested on premises about the place of religion in the public square. 
While the central controversies over this initiative were not over civil marriage equality, they 
still raise pertinent questions about government partnerships with civil society actors and about 
the best understanding of pluralism in a constitutional democracy.  
Both in Fulton and in the debate over the faith-based initiative, concerns over 
“discrimination” take two forms: first, that religious entities who contract with government 
might be subject to governmental discrimination in not receiving funding and, second, that 
religious entities who contract with government might themselves engage in discrimination. 
With respect to the former, for example, foster parent and name plaintiff Sharonell wrote in an 
op-ed: “As a single mom and woman of color, I've known a thing or two about discrimination 
over the years. But I have never known vindictive religious discrimination like this, and I feel the 
fresh sting of bias watching my faith publicly derided by Philadelphia's politicians.”8  
II. Prior Iterations of the LBGTQ Equality v. Religious Liberty Clash: Obergefell 
and Masterpiece 
The efforts by same-sex couples to gain equal access to marriage licenses, that is, the 
right to marry, triggered claims that recognizing such a right to marry would inevitably and 
sharply conflict with the religious liberty of beliefs of persons and religious institutions who 
sincerely believe that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. Even though such 
couples sought access to civil marriage, not religious marriage, objections premised on religious 
                                                          
8 Sharonell Fulton, Opinion, My Faith Led Me to Foster More than 40 Kids; Philly is Wrong to Cut Ties with Catholic 
Foster Agencies, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 24, 2018, 2:25 PM), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/opinion/commentary/catholic-social-services-philadelphia-lawsuit-lgbtq-gay-
foster-parents-adoption-sharonell-fulton-20180524.html. 
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liberty predicted that this change in civil law would put protected First Amendment freedoms at 
risk in various ways. In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
recognized the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry while seeking to reassure those 
with traditional religious beliefs that they remained free to express and advocate for their sincere 
religious beliefs.9 Kennedy wrote: “[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that 
conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they 
nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”10  However, Kennedy explained, it would “disparage” the 
choices and “diminish” the personhood of same-sex couples if “sincere, personal opposition” to 
same-sex marriage “becomes enacted into law and public policy,” because it would “put the 
imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own 
liberty is then denied.”11 This denial to same-sex couples of “the same legal treatment as 
opposite sex couples” was unjustifiable, given that (as Kennedy concluded) the four principles 
and traditions that explain why marriage is a fundamental right applied equally to same-sex 
couples.12  
This respectful language about sincere religious opposition did not prevent the four 
dissenters in Obergefell from claiming that Kennedy was, in effect, engaging in a “jurisprudence 
of denigration”13 and portraying those who resisted (as Justice Roberts put it) the majority’s 
evolved understanding of marriage as bigoted.14 Justice Scalia’s dissent charged the majority 
with contending that the age-old one man-one woman definition of marriage “cannot possibly be 
                                                          
9 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015). 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 670-71. 
13 For this phrase, see generally Stephen D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U. C. DAVIS. L. REV. 675 
(2014) (applying it to United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)). 
14 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 711-12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT? 178-80 
(2020). 
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supported by anything other than ignorance and bigotry.”15 Justice Alito’s much-quoted dissent 
evocatively warned that, despite such “reassurances” by the majority, those who dissent from the 
new “orthodoxy” might be able to whisper their beliefs in their homes, but, if they uttered them 
in public, would “risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, 
and schools.”16 Alito predicted that Justice Kennedy’s analogies between excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage to now-repudiated forms of race and sex discrimination in marriage 
would invite people to “vilify” as bigots those who oppose same-sex marriage.17  
Obergefell’s holding that states must extend “civil marriage” to same-sex couples on the 
“same terms and conditions as [to] opposite sex-couples”18 resolved—or should have resolved— 
the issue of access to marriage itself in those states still precluding such access under state 
“defense of marriage” laws. However, some public officials asserted that having to issue 
marriage licenses or performing marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples violated their 
religious liberty. Several states have enacted laws permitting conscience- or religion-based 
exemptions from such duties, provided that some public official can perform them.19 In response 
to the highly-publicized refusal to issue marriage licenses by County Clerk Kim Davis (recently 
valorized by Justices Alito and Thomas as one of the first “victims of [the Obergefell] Court’s 
cavalier treatment of religion”20), Kentucky changed its marriage license form so that clerks 
neither “issued” nor signed it.21 Alabama abolished entirely the “requirement that a marriage 
                                                          
15 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 741 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 676 (majority opinion). 
19 For such recusal laws, see, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-5.5 (2021); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-62-5(8)(a) (2021). 
20 Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3, 3 (Mem)  (2020), 19-926 Davis v. Ermold (10/05/2020) (supremecourt.gov). 
21 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100 (West 2017). 
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license be issued by the judge of probate,”22 evidently because of the continued objection by 
some judges to same-sex marriage and their refusal to issue licenses to anyone.23  
This battle over the import of Obergefell featured in another iteration of the evident 
conflict between civil marriage equality and religious liberty: access by same-sex couples to 
wedding-related goods and services like wedding and reception sites, flowers, cakes, and 
wedding photography.24 In states and cities with public accommodations laws that include sexual 
orientation as a protected category, owners of such businesses with religious objections to same-
sex marriage claimed that their religious liberty required that they be exempt from public 
accommodations laws requiring them to serve same-sex couples. By contrast to the quest for 
marriage licenses, these cases involved the quest for goods and services in the marketplace, 
which might seem like a “private” space. However, most states deem businesses open to the 
public to be “public accommodations” subject to the state’s antidiscrimination laws. Thus, claims 
for religious exemptions from such laws, as Professor Melissa Murray aptly argues, seek to 
“shrink the public sphere—and the domain of state-endorsed laws and norms—and expand the 
private sphere and the authority of private actors who operate outside of the State’s reach.”25 
These cases, thus, raised issues about who should be protected in civic spaces. A feature uniting 
them is that they arose in states with public accommodations law that had evolved to include 
“sexual orientation” as a protected category.   
                                                          
22 Act of May 31, 2019, No. 2019-340, 2019 Ala. Acts 340 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 22-9A-17, 30-1-
5, 30-1-12, 30-1-16). 
23 Alabama Legislature Passes Bill to End Judge-Issued Marriage Licenses, WHNT NEWS (May 23, 2019, 3:48 
PM), https://whnt.com/news/alabama-legislature-passes-bill-to-end-judge-issued-marriage-licenses/. 
24 Some of these conflicts predated Obergefell. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 
2013) (holding that photographer who declined to photograph a same-sex couple’s commitment ceremony violated 
New Mexico’s public accommodations law).   
25 Melissa Murray, The Geography of Bigotry, 99 B.U.L.REV. 2611, 2627 (2019) (commenting on MCCLAIN, supra 
note 14). On exemptions to state public accommodations laws, see generally, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of 
Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631 (2016).  
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Even prior to Obergefell, several state courts had ruled that refusal to provide goods and 
services to a same-sex couple was discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, rejecting the 
argument that the refusal was not based on the would-be customers’ sexual orientation, but 
instead on their marriage.26 But Obergefell’s majority opinion and several dissents provided new 
constitutional touchpoints in this controversy. As I detailed in Who’s the Bigot?, the nation’s 
most famous wedding cake baker, Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, along with his 
many amici, appealed both to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion to insist the Court honor 
Obergefell’s “promise” to protect his sincere, decent, and honorable beliefs and to the dissents to 
warn that ruling against him would lead to traditional believers like him being branded as bigots 
and driven from the public square.27  They strenuously rejected analogies to refusals of goods 
and services based on race and deflected the significance of the fact that the public 
accommodations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title II) did not include religious exemptions. 
As Texas, Alabama, and some other states asserted: “Public-accommodations concerns of past 
eras are not present here.”28 They also insisted that the harms that Phillips would suffer to his 
conscience and/or his business if compelled to design and bake cakes for same-sex couples or  
stop offering wedding cakes entirely far outweighed the dignitary and other harms to the couple 
denied service, Craig and Mullins, who could readily find bakeries willing and eager to serve 
them.29    
                                                          
26 For elaboration, see MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 186-91 (2020) (discussing Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 
309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)). 
27 Id. at 194-203 (analyzing briefs). 
28 Id. at 198 (quoting Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)). 
29 Id. at 196 (discussing Brief of Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. 
in Support of Petitioners at 30, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)). 
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Pertinent to Fulton, some religious amici supporting Phillips insisted that the case was 
not simply about wedding cakes and religiously-motivated business owners, but also about the 
broader question of the terms on which religious entities could participate in the public square – 
or the “public sphere.”30 Pluralism, civility, and tolerance, they argued, required robust 
protections of First Amendment freedoms so that people of conscience could live their faith 
everywhere. For example, the amicus brief for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(quoting Pope Francis) insisted that religion “should not be relegated to the inner sanctum of 
personal life,” but instead had rightful concerns over “societal and national life” and “the 
soundness of civic institutions.”31 The brief specifically elaborated on how “religious exercise” 
took many forms, not only that of “religiously motivated” businesses (like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop) but also the numerous acts of charity performed by religiously motivated institutions, 
including those engaged in providing adoptive and foster care services.32 At stake, then, was “the 
freedom to live according to one’s religious beliefs in daily life and, in doing so, advance the 
common good.”33 The First Amendment protected the “freedom of religious institutions that 
serve the public and the most vulnerable members of society as a way of living faith through 
action in the public square.”34 The brief offered as a cautionary tale the experience of Catholic 
Charities in Illinois, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia, “forced to shut down rather 
than comply with government mandates to place children with same-sex couples on the same 
basis as opposite-sex couples.”35 The brief appealed to pluralism in insisting that “the common 
good” would be advanced by allowing religiously-motivated people and institutions to act on the 
                                                          
30 Brief for Conf. of Cath. Bishops, Colo. Cath. Conf. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal at 4, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 4, 19. 
33 Id. at 6. 
34 Id. at 19. 
35 Id. at 19. 
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truth as they discern it, including in “the public square,” particularly on “contentious issues” on 
which debate should continue.36 
Craig and Mullins, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and their amici countered 
each of these arguments. First, they explained that to uphold Colorado’s public accommodations 
law, the Court need not deem Phillips a bigot, analogize him to a racist, or doubt his sincerity: 
Colorado’s law reached conduct, not belief, and applied regardless of one’s motive for refusing 
service. They insisted on the relevance of the race analogy, contending that allowing a religious 
exemption to Title II would have seriously blunted its impact, given (then) still-pervasive 
religious beliefs in racial segregation. In support, they reminded the Court of its earlier case,   
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, in which a restaurant order brought an unsuccessful 
constitutional challenge to Title II on the ground that requiring him to serve Black customers 
along with white ones violated his religious beliefs about racial segregation.37 They explained 
the problems of finding a limiting principle for religious exemptions to modern state public 
accommodations laws, which are much broader than Title II in covering many protected 
characteristics, including sex. Finally, they insisted that broad exemptions from Colorado’s law 
could result in serious harm to LGBTQ persons, drawing on social science about minority stress, 
the persistence of “pervasive” discrimination against LGBTQ persons in Colorado and elsewhere 
in the U.S., and the intersectional harms face by LGBTQ persons of color. 38  
Respondents and amici also appealed to values of pluralism, civility, and tolerance, but to 
argue that such values require limits to acting on religious beliefs in businesses open to the 
public. In a religiously diverse nation like the U.S., amici cautioned, there could be no principled 
                                                          
36 Id. at 31-32. 
37 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C 1966), aff’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967, aff’d, 390 U.S. 400 (per curiam).  
38 See MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 199-209 (analyzing briefs). 
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limit to a conscience exemption. Instead, as the church-state scholars amicus brief argued, there 
would be numerous clashes between “commands of conscience” and state laws “that protect 
fundamental rights, equal protection, health and safety, free markets, or other social goods.”39 As 
Justice Scalia famously observed in Employment Division v. Smith, permitting religious beliefs to 
justify not obeying the law would “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself,”40 raising 
“the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost 
every conceivable kind.”41  
 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy reversed the appellate court’s upholding of 
Colorado’s antidiscrimination ground on the relatively narrow ground that the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission showed “hostility” toward Phillips’ religious beliefs, contrary to the First 
Amendment requirement that government officials be “neutral” when considering claims that a 
law violates one’s sincere religious belief. 42 As I have elaborated elsewhere, because of this 
flaw, the Court did not resolve the question about whether and when public accommodations 
laws must exempt business owners with sincere religious objections to same-sex marriage or, in 
the alternative, when the latter must comply with such laws despite those beliefs. Instead, 
Kennedy advised that such disputes, in “future cases,” must “be resolved with tolerance, without 
undue respect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when 
they seek goods and services in an open market.”43 But Kennedy’s opinion, nonetheless, offered 
enough nuggets or intimations for both sides to claim partial victory. Defenders of laws like 
                                                          
39 Id. at 199-200 (quoting Brief of Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, 12, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
40 Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
41 Id. at 888. 
42 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’s, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731-32 (2018). 
43 MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 208  (quoting Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732).   
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Colorado’s and of LBGTQ equality were relieved that Kennedy recognized that state law could 
“protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever 
products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other 
members of the public.”44 And he implicitly embraced the relevance of the race analogy by 
citing to Piggie Park for the proposition that even though “religious and philosophical objections 
to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression,” the 
general rule is that “such objections do not allows business owners and other actors in the 
economy and society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a 
neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”45 Kennedy also noted the changed 
political and constitutional landscape due in part to precedents like Obergefell: “Our society has 
come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts of 
inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some 
instances, must protect them in their civil rights.”46  Kennedy also appealed to “the history and 
dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public 
accommodations” to explain how broad exemptions from antidiscrimination laws could lead to 
“community wide-stigma” toward “gay persons.”47 
On the other hand, Phillips’ supporters could claim victory in Kennedy’s ruling that the 
CCRC showed “hostility” and animosity toward Phillips’ beliefs encouraging. Even though 
Kennedy did not use the language of bigotry, his conclusion could also fuel charges, in future 
cases, that public officials who denied religious exemptions exhibited antireligious bigotry.48 
                                                          
44Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727-28.    
45 Id. at 1727. 
46 Id. at 1728. 
47 Id. at 1727. 
48 MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 208. 
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Further, Kennedy criticized one Commissioner’s statement that it was a “despicable piece of 
rhetoric” to use religion to harm others, given the appeal to religion to justify slavery and the 
Holocaust, as “disparaging” Phillips’ religion by calling the appeal to religious beliefs 
“despicable” and also by implying the appeal to religion was “insubstantial and even insincere.” 
This comment, which Kennedy read as comparing Phillips’ beliefs to religious defenses of 
slavery and the Holocaust, was not “disavowed” by other officials and thus failed to show 
“fairness and impartiality.”49  One reading of Kennedy’s sympathetic rendering of Phillips’ 
dilemma of conscience and his sharp criticism of the CCRC for its “hostility” was that 
comparisons to religious racism of the past was inappropriate.   
 All these different readings of Masterpiece would be pertinent in Fulton, where the 
conflict shifted from a business owner offering goods and services in the marketplace to a 
religious non-profit contracting with government to offer foster care services. As a preface to my 
analysis of Fulton, I now step back in time to consider controversies over such public-private 
partnerships that arose in connection with the “faith-based initiative” first introduced by 
President George W. Bush. As my title suggests, one key issue about the initiative was whether 
to conceive of public-private partnerships as “unleashing” the power of faith as religious entities 
provided social services in accordance with their beliefs or as “harnessing” that power so that 
such entities provided those services in a way consistent with public values and constitutional 
limits. That quandary, I will argue, is also pertinent for assessing Fulton.  
Part III. Looking Back to the Faith-Based Initiative 
                                                          
49 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729-30. 
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In January 2001, during President George W. Bush’s first month in office, he announced 
a “faith-based initiative,” centered in the newly-created White House Office of Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives (“OFBCI”), which would coordinate a federal effort “to expand 
opportunities for faith-based and other community organizations and to strengthen their capacity 
to better meet social needs in America’s communities.”50 The “blueprint” for this initiative, 
evocatively titled Rallying the Armies of Compassion, described the creation of OFBCI as a 
centerpiece of the Bush Administration and of “compassionate conservatism.”51 The blueprint 
pronounced faith-based and community groups as “indispensable” to meeting “the needs of poor 
Americans and distressed neighborhoods,” adding that “[g]overnment cannot be replaced by 
charities, but it can and should welcome them as partners.”52 To do so, the government initiative 
would (in the following alliterative phrase) “enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the 
heroic works of faith-based and community groups across America.”53 It sought to expand to 
more governmental agencies and social spending the “bipartisan,” “Charitable Choice 
provision,” first included in the 1996 welfare law, that allowed “private, religious, and charitable 
organizations” to compete “on an equal footing for Federal funding to provide services,” and to 
“protect their religious character” if they accepted federal funds.54   
                                                          
50 Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 13199 (2002), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2002-title3-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2002-title3-vol1-eo13199.pdf. 
51 THE WHITE HOUSE, RALLYING THE ARMIES OF COMPASSION (2001), H.R. Doc. No. 107-36, 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d01972003y&view=1up&seq=1. [Also available at: 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/reports/faithbased.html, but without page numbers.] In 
describing this initiative, I incorporate part of the analysis I did of this “faith-based initiative” several years into its 
creation. See generally Linda C. McClain, Unleashing or Harnessing “Armies of Compassion”?: Reflections on the 
Faith-Based Initiative, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 361 (2008).  
52 President George W. Bush, Foreword to THE WHITE HOUSE, RALLYING THE ARMIES OF COMPASSION 4, 4 (2001), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d01972003y&view=1up&seq=1. [Also available at: 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/reports/faithbased.html, but without page numbers.] 
53 Id. 
54 THE WHITE HOUSE, RALLYING THE ARMIES OF COMPASSION, supra note 51, at 14. 
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A key motivation for the initiative was the premise that, despite the long history of 
governmental partnerships with the nonprofit sector, laws and policies unduly constrained 
partnerships with religious organizations. Hence, the imagery of “unleashing” the power of 
“faith-based and community solutions”—the “armies of compassion”— so that overly strict 
ideas of separation of church and state and neutrality did not hinder them. Charitable groups, 
including religious ones, should compete “on a level playing field, so long as they achieve valid 
public purposes”; “bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination, evenhandedness, and 
neutrality” should be the operative ones.55 A subsequent report, under OFBCI Director John 
DiIulio, Unlevel Playing Field, concluded that there was “widespread bias against faith-and 
community based organizations in Federal social service programs,” due to policies and practices 
going “well beyond sensible constitutional restrictions.”56 In seeking to eliminate that supposed 
“bias” and “unleash” those organizations, however, DiIulio found it difficult to distinguish 
between directly funding human services and funding religion. Some conservatives rejected this 
effort at line-drawing, believing that “‘real’ faith-based groups” should receive federal funding, 
even if they sought to “convert people to a particular faith.”57 On the other hand, proposed 
legislation implementing the initiative stalled in Congress precisely over concern with direct 
funding of religious activities and also whether religious entities permitted to discriminate in 
hiring under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act would receive this direct funding.58  
                                                          
55 Id. 
56 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES, UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD: BARRIERS 
TO PARTICIPATION BY FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS 
(Aug. 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/unlevelfield.html. 
57 McClain, supra note 51, at 373 (quoting DAVID KUO, TEMPTING FAITH: AN INSIDE STORY OF POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION 159-60 (2006)). 
58 Id. at 373.  
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 temporarily pushed this and much else in 
President Bush’s domestic agenda aside, focusing his Administration on homeland security and 
what became the long “war on terror.” But, in 2002, Bush renewed his efforts with a new 
Director of OFBCI, Jim Towey (who had worked with Mother Teresa); Towey spoke of the 
power of faith and praised Bush for his vision of “unleashing new armies of compassion that will 
change countless lives.”59 More legislative efforts ensued. Proponents of The Charity Aid, 
Recovery, and Empowerment Act (CARE) sought to appease conservative and liberal critics by 
including provisions that, on the one hand, protected religious groups against discrimination in 
receiving federal funding simply because of their religious nature and, on the other, provided that  
religious groups receiving federal funds should not be exempt from antidiscrimination laws 
concerning hiring.60 Over the next several years, lawmakers, nonprofits, scholars, and others 
debated the initiative, including such questions as what role “faith” played in delivering social 
services (e.g., as the motive for delivering such services or as the method of doing so), whether 
faith-based providers performed better than their secular counterparts (and on what metric), and 
whether (as Charles Glenn explored, in The Ambiguous Embrace) faith-based providers could 
accept government funds and regulation without destroying their autonomy and distinctiveness 
that makes them effective.61  While Congress never passed implementing legislation, the Bush 
Administration implemented the initiative through executive orders and agency regulations.62 By 
the end of the Bush’s term, a dozen federal departments and “Agency Centers for Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives,” charged with including faith-based and community groups;” over 
                                                          
59 Id. at 374-75. 
60 Id. at 375 (discussing efforts by Senator Rick Santorum and Senator Joseph Lieberman to defend CARE). 
61 Id. at 387-404 (discussing perspectives on the question: “why does identity matter?”).   
62 See Stanley Carlson-Thies, The Biden Partnerships Plan Is Faith-Based Initiative 5.0, INSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM ALLIANCE (Jun. 22, 2021). 
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two dozen states had passed legislation either aimed at increasing state partnerships with faith-
based organizations or referring to them as potential partners in social service programs.63 
A full narrative on the subsequent incarnations of the OFBCI is not relevant to this 
article. It bears mention, however, that President Obama retained (and renamed) the initiative as 
the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. Obama echoed Bush in urging greater 
involvement of civil society in solving social problems, although his advisory council on the 
initiative tweaked the Bush Administration’s regulations after reviewing their constitutionality.64 
The new regulations retained one controversial provision -- the freedom of religious entities 
receiving government funds to consider religion in their hiring decision – but also extended to all 
government-funded social programs (not just Charitable Choice ones) a beneficiary’s right to  
request an alternative to a “faith-based provider” and also to be informed of their religious 
protections.65 President Trump campaigned on pledges to protect religious liberty and on being 
“the great friend of evangelical Christians” and took various executive actions to do so (e.g., 
conscience protections from the Affordable Care Act and rollbacks on protecting LGBTQ 
persons).66 However, Trump did not announce a “White House Faith and Opportunity Initiative” 
until May 2018; instead of a separate office, the initiative was eventually overseen by a new  
“partnership advisor” in the Office of Public Liaison, but lacked leadership.67  In February 2021, 
President Biden established (in effect, reestablished) the “White House Office of Faith-Based 
and Neighborhood Partnerships” and helmed it with Melissa Rogers, a prior director of the 
Obama-era office and a sharp critic of the Trump initiative for weakening protections of 
                                                          
63 McClain, supra note 51, at 382. 
64 Carlson-Thies, supra note 62, at 3-4.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 4; Executive Order 13831 of May 3, 2018, 83 FED. REG. (No. 89) 20715 (May 8, 2018). 
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beneficiaries.68  The Biden executive order echoed President Bush’s alliterative aim of the 
federal government seeking to “enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of 
community-serving organizations, both faith-based and secular, to the extent permitted by 
law.”69 Notably, among the aims of this government-civil society collaboration are to “combat 
systemic racism” and “strengthen pluralism.”70 The order commits to strengthening such 
organizations’ ability “to deliver services effectively in partnership with Federal, State, and local 
governments and with other private organizations, while preserving our fundamental 
constitutional commitments guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws and free exercise of 
religion and forbidding the establishment of religion.”71 
How to honor these “fundamental constitutional commitments” proved a challenge from 
the initiative’s inception, but the initiative was aided by changes in the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While, during the 1970s, the Supreme Court “adopted a 
categorical prohibition on government aid for pervasively sectarian organizations,” by the early 
21st century, it was interpreting the Establishment Clause in a way that opened the door to much 
wider funding of religious non-profits.72 As Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle observe, this 
jurisprudence supported two funding tracks for the initiative’s support of social service 
programs. First, government could not directly fund “specifically religious activities,” so that, if 
a grant recipient had social services with religious content, they “must be privately financed and 
                                                          
68 Executive Order 14015 of February 14, 2021, 86 FED. REG. (No. 31) 10007 (Feb. 18, 2021); on Rogers, see 
Carlson-Thies, supra note 62, at 1, 5. 
69Executive Order 14015 of February 14, 2021, supra note 68, at 1.  
70 FACT SHEET: President Biden Reestablishes the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships, Feb. 14, 2021. 
71 Executive Order 14015, supra note 69, at 1.  
72 Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity at 27 in 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson, Chad Flanders, and Micah Schwartman, eds., forthcoming 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535991. 
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separated by time or place from publicly financed services.”73 Second, government could 
indirectly support social welfare programs in which social services are “interwined” with 
religious content when a beneficiary makes an “uncoerced choice” of that program (e.g., through 
vouchers.74 The “constitutional logic” is that this “free choice of beneficiaries,” where the 
beneficiary picks a program with religious content while secular choices are available, means 
that government does not directly fund religion.75  
Some defenders of religious liberty argue that the prohibition of direct aid in this two-
track approach is governmental discrimination against “religious providers who are not willing 
or able to segregate secular and religious elements of their program.”76 Lupu and Tuttle defend 
this line-drawing as consistent with “constitutional values,” concern for the “dignity of program 
beneficiaries,” and the premise that “civil government should not use religion as a mean to the 
state’s own ends, however laudable those goals might be.”77 While the Fulton case does not raise 
precisely the same issues, it does involve the question of on what terms a religious non-profit 
that provides social services may receive direct governmental funds. What happens, for example, 
when the state’s “ends,” such as delivering foster care services without discrimination based on 
protected categories, conflicts with a religious entities’ line-drawing on who they will serve? Just 
as faith-based providers argued they could not divorce their faith from the services they offered, 
Chief Justice Roberts observes, in Fulton, that “the religious views of CSS inform its work in 
                                                          
73 Id. at 28-29. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 29. 
76 Id. (giving examples of Stanley Carlson-Thies and proponents of “freedom of the church”). 
77 Id. at 30. 
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this system,” including its belief that “‘marriage is a sacred bond between a man and a 
woman.’”78 
These questions raise the issue of the meaning and value of pluralism in a constitutional 
democracy. Defenders of the faith-based initiative who supported direct funding argued that 
religious groups should be able to deliver religiously-infused services in which faith was a 
central element so long as persons could choose among religious and secular providers.  Such 
appeal relates to the role played by ideas of subsidiarity; “compassionate conservatism,” for 
example, was sometimes called “subsidiarity conservatism.”79 Some proponents of the initiative 
argued that devolving federal power both to state and local government and to associations 
would correct the federal government’s undue expansion into and usurpation of work that should 
be done locally and by civil society. A mantra was that government funding (including indirect 
funding of faith-infused or faith-integrated methods) would preserve “value pluralism”: as 
Stephen Monsma wrote, government should “supplement—not supplant—families, houses of 
worship, self-help organizations, block clubs, community development corporations, and other 
manifestations of civil society.”80  
The value of pluralism and of respecting the historical role of civil society also featured 
in arguments in Fulton. At oral argument, the attorney for CSS referred to CSS’s work in foster 
care as something it had done “for two centuries” before the City of Philadelphia became 
involved. 81  With that baseline, of course, the restrictions imposed through the City’s contract 
                                                          
78 Fulton, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), slip op. at 2. 
79 McClain, supra note 51, at 404 (quoting Senator Rick Santorum, A Compassionate Conservative Agenda: 
Addressing Poverty for the Next Millennium, 26 J. LEGIS. 93, 93 (2000)). 
80 STEPHEN MONSMA, PUTTING FAITH IN PARTNERSHIPS 185 (2004) (cited in McClain, supra note 51, at 367). 
81 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Fulton v. City of Phila. (2020) (No. 19-123), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-123_o758.pdf. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925800
21 
 
with CSS due to the nondiscrimination provisions of the Fair Practices Ordinance seem like 
unfair and unconstitutional burdens – an incursion by the City on the valuable and honorable 
work done by CSS as a civil society actor. The Solicitor General (amici for CSS) appealed to 
pluralism to contend that “gay persons” could accept CSS receiving an exemption from serving 
them as prospective foster parents them without feeling their own “dignity and worth” 
diminished, stretching Masterpiece Cakeshop’s observations that “gay persons” would not 
experience that diminution because clergy had a religious exemption from performing wedding 
ceremonies. The Solicitor General contended such couples would recognize that a “pluralistic 
nation that respects religious tolerance” could accommodate “longstanding, deep-seated, sincere 
religious beliefs that oppose same-sex marriage” as consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.82 
CSS’s counsel and the Solicitor General argued that CSS had turned no same-sex couples away, 
and that there are plenty of other foster-care agencies that could serve such couples. Failing to 
respect pluralism, counsel contended, would drive CSS out of the important work it had done for 
centuries and with no “compelling” interest, since gay couples interested in becoming foster 
parents have many other social service agencies willing to help them. Counsel for the City, in 
turn, challenged this baseline, countering that CSS had not done “this” – contracting with the 
City to certify eligible foster parents under the City’s foster care program – for centuries.83  
While Chief Justice Roberts does not mention explicitly mention pluralism, his opinion opens 
with the narrative of the Catholic Church serving “the needy children of Philadelphia for over 
two centuries,” highlights how Philadelphia’s foster care system “depends on cooperation 
between the City and private foster agencies like CSS,” and closes by quoting Philadelphia’s 
                                                          
82 Id. at 40. 
83 Id. at 84-85. 
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acknowledgment that “CSS has ‘long been a point of light in the City’s foster-care system.’”84   
As discussed below, Roberts also interprets the First Amendment as requiring that CSS should 
have an accommodation so that it can “continue serving the children of Philadelphia in a manner 
consistent with its religious beliefs.”85  
Part IV. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia 
My evaluation of Fulton will be as follows. First, I offer a brief analysis of certain themes 
in the party and amicus briefs: their rhetoric (if any) of bigotry and discussion of the race 
analogy; their deployment of Obergefell and Masterpiece, and their evaluation of the 
significance of the public-private partnership—the contract—between the City and CSS.86 
Second, I observe the presence – or absence – of these themes in the majority and concurring 
opinions in Fulton.  
A. Thematic Analysis of the Party and Amicus Briefs  
1. Petitioners 
The Rhetoric of Bigotry and the Race Analogy. As in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the rhetoric of 
bigotry appeared more frequently in the briefs of the parties challenging the application of 
antidiscrimination law and their amici than in those defending such laws.87 Not surprisingly, the 
several briefs for CSS that used such rhetoric also enlisted the Obergefell and Masterpiece 
Cakeshop dissents. Petitioners argued: “as the dissent warned in Obergefell, ‘[t]hese apparent 
                                                          
84 Fulton, Slip op. at 1-2, 15. In an arguable precursor of the faith-based initiative, President George H.W. Bush, in 
his January 1989 inaugural address, called upon Americans to be “a thousand points of light” through service to 
each other; he later established a “Daily Point of Light” award, stressing how “a neighbor can help a neighbor.” 
Points of Light, https://www.pointsoflight.org/history/. 
85 Fulton, slip op. at 15. 
86 This is a selective, not exhaustive evaluation. 
87 For a comparison in Masterpiece, see MCCLAIN, supra note 14, at 192-203.  
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assaults on the character of fairminded people will have an effect, in society and in court,’ and it 
would be a mistake ‘to portray everyone who does not share the majority’s “better informed 
understanding” as bigoted.’”88 
Several amici for CSS argued that City officials equated CSS’s religious beliefs with 
bigotry.89 They invoked the warnings in Justice Alito’s Obergefell dissent,90 arguing that the 
City was “unquestionably” treating CSS “as a bigot,” which “could be construed as invidious 
discrimination.”91 As did the Obergefell dissenters, these amici viewed drawing analogies 
between race and sex discrimination, on the one hand, and sexual orientation discrimination – as 
well as between religious objections to interracial marriage and to same-sex marriage – as 
tantamount to a charge of bigotry.92 For example, the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty 
distinguished between unlawfully turning away persons based on race from turning away same-
sex couples based on religious views, which should not be “equat[ed] . . . with bigoted 
discrimination.”93 As in Masterpiece, some amici sought to draw a line between core protected 
categories like race and the “vast expansion of covered categories” (i.e., categories like sexual 
orientation), which “often occurs with little analysis of the difference between race and newly 
protected classes.”94 While landmark civil rights legislation properly sought to “eradicate 
America’s long history of racial discrimination,” the Institute for Faith and Family argued, “as 
                                                          
88 Brief for Petitioners at 35, Fulton v. City of Phila., No. 19-123 (U.S. filed May 27, 2020) (quoting Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 712 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). Briefs for this case are available online at 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania/.  
89 See, e.g., Brief for Jewish Coal. for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 27, Fulton; 
Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam. & Int’l Conf. of Evangelical Chaplain Endorsers as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 13, Fulton [hereinafter, Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam.]; Brief for Great Lakes Just. Ctr. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Fulton. 
90 See, e.g., Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 13; Brief for Archbishop Jerome E. Listecki & Roman 
Cath. Archdiocese of Milwaukee as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Fulton. 
91 Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 13. 
92 Brief for Jewish Coal. for Religious Liberty, supra note 89, at 27. 
93 Id. 
94 Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 9-10. 
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protection expands to more places and people, so does the potential to employ anti-
discrimination principles to suppress traditional viewpoints and impose social change on 
unwilling participants.”95  
A number of CSS’s amici challenged the race/sexual orientation analogy without 
referring to bigotry. These briefs sounded a theme that CSS’s attorney and the Solicitor General 
voiced in the oral argument: racism is special—“sui generis”—and “implicates unique historical, 
constitutional, and institutional concerns.”96 Thus, ending race discrimination is a uniquely 
compelling and fundamental governmental interest, warranting the highest judicial scrutiny. 
Some amici contended that whereas race is an immutable characteristic, CSS discriminates 
based on LGBTQ conduct.97 They argue that listing a characteristic other than race in a statute 
does not create a compelling government interest in protecting groups other than racial 
minorities from discrimination. The Solicitor General offered a different race analogy: religious 
stereotypes are at play in the City’s treatment of CSS and are comparable to impermissible racial 
stereotypes.98  
Appeals to Obergefell and Masterpiece. Some amici expressly criticized Obergefell, 
arguing that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion failed to consider the impact of its ruling on 
religious liberty; some amici cited the prediction in Justice Thomas’s Obergefell dissent of an 
inevitable conflict.99 On the other hand, petitioners and their amici also affirmatively enlisted 
Kennedy’s majority opinion, reminding the Court of Obergefell’s “promise” that its holding 
                                                          
95 Id. at 11. 
96 Brief for Neb., Ariz. & Ohio as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 33, Fulton (quoting Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017)). 
97 See Brief for Concerned Women for Am. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 18, Fulton. 
98 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 30, Fulton. 
99 See, e.g., Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 14-17; Brief for Robertson Ctr. for Const. L. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 28-29, Fulton; Br. for Concerned Women for Am. et al., supra note 97, 
at 26; Brief for Life Legal Defense Found. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Fulton. 
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would not disrupt First Amendment rights or interfere with sincerely held religious beliefs 
opposing same-sex marriage.100 Further, they argued that the City had imposed a burden on 
CSS’s sincerely-held beliefs about marriage, citing language from Obergefell in support,101 and 
that such belief — which underlies its opposition to same-sex marriage — is decent and 
honorable.102  
Amici also enlisted Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop to argue that the 
City Council’s statement about “discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious freedom” 
had disparaged religion by characterizing it as insincere.103 They invoked Masterpiece’s 
language about the need for “neutrality” in considering sincere religious beliefs and argued there 
were parallels between statements by the City Council and the Commissioner here and the 
statements at issue in Masterpiece that indicated “hostility.”104 Some amici cited Masterpiece as 
evidence of increasing governmental hostility toward religion.105 Amici who urged the Court to 
overrule Smith appealed to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Masterpiece, describing Smith as 
controversial.106  
                                                          
100 See, e.g., Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 6, 17; Brief for Robertson Ctr. for Const. L., supra 
note 99, at 28-29; Brief for Dorothy Frame et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24, Fulton; Brief for 
Rutherford Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16-17, Fulton. 
101 See, e.g., Brief for 76 U.S. Sens. & Members of House of Reps. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Fulton; Brief for Coal. for Jewish Values et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 33, Fulton; Brief for 
Former Foster Child. & Foster/Adoptive Parents & Cath. Ass’n Found. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
32, Fulton [hereinafter, Brief for Former Foster Child. & Foster/Adoptive Parents]. 
102 See, e.g., Brief for Neb., Ariz. & Ohio, supra note 96, at 31, 34; Brief for Current & Former State Legislators as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23-24, Fulton. 
103 See, e.g., Brief for Jewish Coal. for Religious Liberty, supra note 89, at 27; Brief for United States, supra note 
98, at 32; Brief for State of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 32-33, Fulton; Brief for Galen 
Black as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13-14, Fulton. 
104 See, e.g., Brief for Jewish Coal. for Religious Liberty, supra note 89, at 26-27; Brief for Life Legal Defense 
Found. et al., supra note 99, at 10-12; Brief for Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 13, Fulton; Brief for Christian Colls. & Univs. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 25-27, Fulton; Brief for Rutherford Inst., supra note 100, at 8. 
105 See Brief for State of Tex. et al., supra note 103, at 30-31; Brief for Former Foster Child. & Foster/Adoptive 
Parents, supra note 101, at 31 & n.12. 
106 See, e.g., Brief for Bruderhof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 27-28, Fulton; Brief for 
Robertson Ctr. for Const. L., supra note 99, at 9; Brief for State of Tex. et al., supra note 103, at 20. 
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 CSS’s Status as a Government Contractor. How did the petitioners and their amici defend 
CSS’s position, as a licensed foster care provider, that it would not work with same-sex couples 
despite the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance?107 Petitioners and amici disputed the treatment of 
foster care services as a “public accommodation,” arguing that the contract did not turn a 
religious organization into a public accommodation; petitioners also argued that Philadelphia “is 
using its contracting and funding authority to exclude a disfavored religious actor.”108 They also 
argued that, under the contract, CSS “is an independent contractor... and shall not... be deemed 
an employee of the City.”109  
Both petitioners and amici stressed the long history of religious organizations’ 
involvement in fostering care – before government’s involvement and argued that because CSS 
“cannot perform its foster-care services in violation of its faith, Philadelphia’s actions have the 
effect of banning the group’s ministry.”110 Several amici emphasized that religion was a 
motivator for religious organizations to get involved in foster care work, citing directives in 
religious texts to care for widows and orphans.111  In effect, this work was a form of religious 
exercise: the “exercise of [Christian] faith includes specific work in the world,” 112  including 
“religiously-motivated care for unwanted, abused, or orphaned children.”113 
Some amici distinguished between discrimination (for example, based on race) and a 
refusal to act contrary to religious conscience (for example, based on CSS’s belief about 
                                                          
107 See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F. 3d 130, 146 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[W]hen the agencies confirmed that, 
because of their religious views on marriage, they would not work with gay couples, Human Services ceased 
referring foster children to them.”).  
108 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at 13, 22; Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 32-33. 
109 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at  8. 
110 Brief of Neb. Ariz. & Ohio, supra note 96, at  5, 26.  
111 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at 3-4; Brief for U.S. Conf. Cath. Bishops & Penn. Cath. Conf. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Fulton; Brief for Current & Former State Legislators as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 11-2, Fulton. 
112 Brief for Found. Moral L. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 34, Fulton. 
113 Brief for 76 U.S. Cong. Members as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9 n.5, Fulton. 
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marriage).114 Amici pointed out that CSS never actually turned away any same-sex couple and 
that if they were ever approached by such a couple, they would refer them to another agency who 
could serve them.115 Further, because the City is free to use other agencies to place children with same-sex 
couples, CSS need not do so.116 Another argument was that CSS is willing to work with single 
LGBTQ individuals, but unwilling to work with unmarried heterosexual couples, thus 
demonstrating that it is not discriminating based on sexual orientation.117 Yet another 
characterization of CSS’s actions was that it does not discriminate against any of the children it 
serves.118   
The Party and Amicus Briefs: Respondents 
 The Rhetoric of Bigotry and the Race Analogy. Virtually no briefs filed on behalf of 
respondents used the rhetoric of bigotry. The one brief that did so extensively, the Brief for Legal 
Scholars in Support of Equality, urged the Court to reject the argument that the race analogy is 
irrelevant to the instant case because, while race discrimination was clearly rooted in bigotry, not 
sincere religious beliefs, CSS’s refusal to provide services to same-sex couples is rooted in 
sincere religious beliefs.119 The brief challenges this oversimplified historical contrast, 
explaining that those who defended segregation and opposed interracial marriage on religious 
                                                          
114 See, e.g., Brief for Inst. for Faith & Fam., supra note 89, at 13-14. 
115 See, e.g., Brief for Neb., Ariz. & Ohio, supra note 96, at 37; Brief for Robertson Ctr. for Const. L., supra note 99, 
at 29; Brief for Concerned Women for Am. et al., supra note 97, at 9-10; Brief for Current & Former State 
Legislators, supra note 102, at 16; Brief for Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al., supra note 104, at 28; 
Brief for Dorothy Frame et al., supra note 100, at 3; Brief for Fifteen Penn. State Sens. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 2, Fulton. 
116 Brief for Former Foster Child. & Foster/Adoptive Parents, supra note 101, at 23. 
117 See, e.g., Brief for United States, supra note 98, at 3; Brief for Ams. for Prosperity Found. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 6-9, Fulton. 
118 See, e.g., Brief for New Hope Fam. Svcs., Inc. & Cath. Charities W. Mich. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 16, Fulton; Brief for 76 U.S. Sens. & Members of House of Reps., supra note 101, at 5. 
119 See generally Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equal. in Support of Respondents, Fulton. As noted earlier, I 
joined this brief. For some of its historical analysis, the brief draws on MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 
14. 
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grounds insisted on their sincerity, rejected the label of “bigot,” and held views that were not out 
of the mainstream. The brief also argues that it is not the Court’s proper role in a First 
Amendment challenge to determine whether or not sincere religious views reflect bigotry.120 
Further, the brief observed, Masterpiece implicitly accepted the race analogy by citing Piggie 
Park.121  
Without explicitly using the rhetoric of bigotry, several amici also pointed to the religious 
origins of beliefs supporting racial discrimination to conclude that the religious source of the 
belief does not distinguish today’s beliefs about same-sex marriage.122 One amici argued that 
Palmore v. Sidoti could have involved religious-based racial discrimination; the state could not 
ratify those views, just as Obergefell spoke of limits to putting the state’s “imprimatur” on 
sincere religious views denying others liberty.123 The brief argued for the same result in the 
instant case: the state cannot ratify religious-based LGBTQ discrimination.124 The brief argued 
that CSS’s belief about marriage also reflects stereotypes about the proper roles of men and 
women in child-rearing and asserted that “Palmore teaches that ‘the Constitution cannot control 
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.’”125  
 While petitioners and their amici advanced the race is special line of argument, 
respondents and their amici resisted such reasoning. They argued that the expansion of protected 
                                                          
120 See Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equal., supra note 119, at 11-14. 
121 See id. at 19-20. On Piggie Park, see also Brief for President of House of Deputies of Episcopal Church et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 31, Fulton. 
122 See, e.g., Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equal., supra note 119, at 8-14; Brief for Scholars of Const. Rts. 
& Ints. of Child. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20-21, Fulton; Brief for Miguel H. Díaz, Ambassador 
to Holy See, Ret. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8-13, Fulton; Brief for Lawrence G. Sager as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-10 & n.4, Fulton; Brief for GLBTQ Legal Advocs. & Defs. & 27 Other 
LGBTQ Advoc. Grps. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24-25, Fulton [hereinafter, Brief for GLAD]; 
Brief for Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 31-32, Fulton. 
123 Brief for Scholars of Const. Rts. & Ints. of Child. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19-22, Fulton. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 25-26 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
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groups in antidiscrimination laws does not change the compelling nature of the government’s 
interest in preventing discrimination.126 Some contended that the protected characteristics 
included in the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance all involve status; further, all are irrelevant to 
parenting ability.127  
Amici also resisted a sharp distinction between race discrimination and sexual orientation 
discrimination, saying a refusal of service would be equally impermissible on both grounds.128 A 
number of amici stressed the problems of limiting principles, warning that to allow religious 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in this case might well lead to permitting 
religious discrimination on the basis of race in the future.129 Stressing the importance of 
intersectionality, some amici explained that race and sexual orientation are not mutually 
exclusive categories: LGBTQ people of color often suffer a particularly severe kind of 
discrimination, which would be exacerbated by a ruling for CSS.130 
 The Role of Obergefell and Masterpiece. Amici also enlisted Obergefell for the 
proposition that even sincere and decent beliefs cannot justify enacting government-sponsored 
                                                          
126 See, e.g., Brief for Alan Brownstein et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Fulton; 
127 See Brief for Local Gov’ts, Mayors & U.S. Conf. of Mayors, supra note 139, at 6; Brief for Mass. et al., supra 
note 131, at 18; Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equal., supra note 119, at 28-30. 
128 See, e.g., Brief for Church-State Scholars, supra note 132, at 14; Brief for Orgs. Serving LGBTQ Youth, supra 
note 131, at 15; Brief for President of House of Deputies of Episcopal Church et al., supra note 121, at 10-11; Brief 
for Legal Scholars in Support of Equal., supra note 119, at 28-30.   
129 See, e.g., Brief for Svcs. & Advoc. for GLBT Elders (“SAGE”) & 25 Other Orgs. Serving Older & Disabled 
Individuals as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 31-32, Fulton; Brief for Local Gov’ts, Mayors & U.S. 
Conf. of Mayors, supra note 139, at 17-18; Brief for Lee C. Bollinger et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fulton, at 20-21; Brief for Indian L. Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15-17, 
Fulton; Brief for Former Svc. Sec’ys & Mod. Mil. Ass’n of Am. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 33-
34 n.15, Fulton; Brief for Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. et al., supra note 122, at 14-16; Brief for N.Y. 
State Bar Ass’n, supra note 136, at 8, 18; Br. of Lutheran Child & Fam. Svcs. of Ill., supra note 136, at 17-18; Brief 
for President of House of Deputies of Episcopal Church et al., supra note 121, at 33; Brief for FosterClub & Former 
Foster Youth, supra note 136, at 2; Brief for Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. & 35 Additional Orgs. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 32, Fulton [hereinafter, Brief for Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr.]; Brief for Nat’l League of Cities 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15, Fulton. 
130 See, e.g., Brief for Ctr. for Study of Soc. Pol’y & Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rts. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 19, Fulton; Brief for GLAD, supra note 122, at 11-12; Brief for Scholars Who Study LGB 
Population, supra note 142, at 7; Brief for Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. et al., supra note 122, at 14-16. 
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discrimination.131 Thus, neither the City of Philadelphia nor its amici questioned the sincerity of 
CSS’s beliefs;132 some amici quoted the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the City treated CSS’s 
beliefs as sincere and deeply held.133 They argued, however, that the sincerity of CSS’s belief is 
not sufficient to grant it a religious exemption.134 Professor Eugene Volokh argued, in a brief 
supporting neither party, that even sincere religious beliefs cannot justify harms imposed on third 
parties.135  
Many amici cited to Obergefell’s recognition that same-sex couples can provide loving 
families for their children136—a fact pertinent to Obergefell’s third, child-protective principle 
about why marriage is fundamental.  They also argued that a ruling for CSS could lead to 
infringing upon the “constellation of benefits” guaranteed by Obergefell. While the briefs do not 
directly mention foster parent eligibility as one of those “benefits,” some amici reasoned that a 
ruling in favor of CSS by the Court could invite other organizations to deny benefits, such as 
family leave and death benefits, which Obergefell specifically mentioned. 137   
                                                          
131 See, e.g., Brief for Scholars of Const. Rts. & Ints. of Child., supra note 122, at 21-22; Brief for Lee C. Bollinger 
et al., supra note 129, at 19 n.11, Fulton; Brief for Church-State Scholars, supra note 132, at 20; Brief for Orgs. 
Serving LGBTQ Youth as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15, Fulton; Brief for Mass. et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, Fulton; Brief for Nat’l LGBT Bar Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 15, Fulton; Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equal., supra note 119, at 9-11. 
132 See, e.g., Brief for Republican Legislators, Elected Offs. & Leaders as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 23, Fulton; Brief for Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28, Fulton. However, 
some amici supporting Philadelphia did point out that there is debate within Catholicism over whether or not to 
accept LGBTQ people. See Brief for 27 Lay Roman Caths. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, 29, 
Fulton. 
133 See Brief for Miguel H. Díaz, Ambassador to Holy See, Ret. et al., supra note 122, at 29.  See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 
157. 
134 See, e.g., Brief for Baptist Joint Comm. for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
28, Fulton. 
135 Brief for Professor Eugene Volokh as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 19-20, Fulton. 
136 See, e.g., Brief for Scholars of Const. Rts. & Ints. of Child., supra note 122, at 10, 30 n.91; Brief for Miguel H. 
Díaz, Ambassador to Holy See, Ret. et al., supra note 122 at 17-19; Brief for Lawrence G. Sager, supra note 122, at 
7; Brief for Church-State Scholars, supra note 132, at 22; Brief for Fam. Equal. & PFLAG Nat’l as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 26, Fulton; Brief for N.Y. State Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 23-24, Fulton; Brief for Lutheran Child & Fam. Svcs. of Ill. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, 
Fulton; Brief for Foster Club & Former Foster Youth as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 & n.2, Fulton; 
Brief for Child.’s Rts. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Fulton; Brief for Nat’l LGBT Bar 
Ass’n et al., supra note 131 at 5.   
137 See, e.g., Brief for GLAD, supra note 122, at 17; Brief for Child.’s Rts. et al., supra note 136, at 33. 
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Obergefell, amici also argued, recognized that same-sex couples experienced dignitary 
harm when denied government benefits or services.138 The City had an interest in protecting 
LGBTQ people from such harm.139 Finally, amici cited Obergefell as reflecting broad principles 
of equal citizenship for LGBTQ people.140 
Amici similarly invoked Masterpiece Cakeshop as recognizing the dignitary and 
stigmatic harm from discrimination.141 Several quoted Justice Kennedy’s statement that “gay 
persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or inferior in dignity and worth.”142 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, amici contended, supported the idea that there are limits to religious 
liberty when it enacts discrimination.143 
Amici also distinguished Masterpiece Cakeshop in contrasting the City’s treatment of 
CSS from the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s supposed “hostility” toward Phillips. 
Masterpiece, amici contended, involved administrative deficiencies and hostility not present in 
                                                          
138 See, e.g., Brief for Lawrence G. Sager, supra note 122, at 17; Brief for Orgs. Serving LGBTQ Youth, supra note 
131, at 15-16; Brief for Leadership Conf. on Civ. & Hum. Rts. et al., supra note 122, at 14-15. 
139 See, e.g., Brief for Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, Fulton; Brief for Annie E. 
Casey Found. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Fulton; Brief for Local Gov’ts, Mayors & 
U.S. Conf. of Mayors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6-7, Fulton; Brief for Church-State Scholars, 
supra note 132, at 14, 17. 
140 See, e.g., Brief for Lawrence G. Sager, supra note 122, at 17; Brief for GLAD, supra note 122, at 8; Brief for 
First Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 27, Fulton; Brief for Prospective Foster 
Parents Subjected to Religiously Motivated Discrimination by Child-Placement Agencies as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 27, Fulton; Brief for Off. of Cook Cnty. Public Guardian as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 27-28, Fulton.  
141 See, e.g., Brief for Orgs. Serving LGBTQ Youth, supra note 131, at 15-16; Brief for Leadership Conf. on Civ. & 
Hum. Rts. et al., supra note 122, at 14-15; Br. of Child.’s Rts. et al., supra note 136, at 31. 
142 See, e.g., Brief for Scholars Who Study LGB Population as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, 
Fulton; Brief for Baptist Joint Comm. for Religious Liberty et al., supra note 134, at 15; Brief for President of 
House of Deputies of Episcopal Church et al., supra note 121, at 10, 29. 
143 See, e.g., Brief for Miguel H. Díaz, Ambassador to Holy See, Ret. et al., supra note 122, at 6; Brief for GLAD, 
supra note 122, at 9; Brief for First Amendment Scholars, supra note 140, at 20-21; Brief for Church-State Scholars, 
supra note 132, at 20; Brief for ADL (Anti-Defamation League) & Other Orgs. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 13, Fulton. 
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the City’s dealings with CSS.144 Some argued that, under Masterpiece, statements are only one 
factor to be considered in assessing respectful treatment.145 
 CSS’s Status as a Government Contractor.  Respondents and their amici emphasized that 
CSS voluntarily contracted with the City and, akin to Smith’s worry, that “[g]overnment ‘could not 
function’ if its contractors could insist upon carrying out their duties according to their personal beliefs.”146 
Several amici characterized CSS as attempting to avoid obligations in a government contract it 
accepted.147 One brief contended that CSS “seeks to assert a ‘veto over public programs’ that do 
not comport with its religious views.”148  
Numerous amici explained that because the government itself cannot discriminate, and 
CSS is providing government services; therefore, it presents a different case than a wholly 
private operation denying services.149 While petitioners and their amici stressed how CSS should 
be able to bring its religious beliefs to bear on how it does its foster-care work, respondents and 
their amici stressed how there are public-regarding limits on private actors’ conduct when they 
contract with government.  Respondent, for example, argued that “[p]ermitting government 
workers to perform their jobs as their religious beliefs dictate often runs up against the 
government’s own obligation to treat citizens equally with regard to religion.”150    
                                                          
144 See, e.g., Brief for 27 Lay Roman Caths., supra note 132, at 28; Brief for Alan Brownstein et al., supra note 126,  
at 18; Brief for Annie E. Casey Found. et al., supra note 139, at 35-36. 
145 See Brief for Am. Atheists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Fulton. 
146 Brief for Respondents, Fulton, at 2, 11 (citing NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 149 (2011)). 
147 See, e.g., Brief for Alan Brownstein et al., supra note 144, at 6; Brief for Gov’t Conts. Professor & Prac. Richard 
C. Loeb as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Fulton; Brief for Prospective Foster Parents Subjected to 
Religiously Motivated Discrimination by Child-Placement Agencies, supra note 140, at 3; Brief for Nat’l Women’s 
L. Ctr., supra note 129, at 3. 
148 See Br. of Baptist Joint Comm. for Religious Liberty et al., supra note 134, at 23 (quoting Lyng v. N.W. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988)). 
149 See, e.g., Brief for Lawrence G. Sager, supra note 122, at 13-21; Brief for Republican Legislators, Elected Offs. 
& Leaders, supra note 132, at 13-15, Brief for Lee C. Bollinger et al., supra note 131at 10-12, Brief for Baptist Joint 
Comm. for Religious Liberty et al., supra note 134, at 19-21; Brief for Mass. et al., supra note 131at 4-14. 
150Brief for Respondents, supra note 146, at 21.   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925800
33 
 
Amici contended that, since the City contracts with private agencies like CSS to carry out 
part of its child welfare responsibilities, those agencies act on the City’s behalf. If the City 
allowed them to exclude same-sex couples, “it would violate the Equal Protection Clause.”151 By 
contrast to petitioners’ amici, several amici for respondents insisted that CSS’s policies did 
constitute discrimination.152 
Addressing CSS’s First Amendment claims, amici explained that “the First Amendment 
does not require governments to use contractors who refuse to provide the contracted services on 
a nondiscriminatory basis.”153 Nor does the First Amendment allow private contractors “to 
dictate the terms under which they provide important government services.”154 At the same time, 
amici stressed that the City did not seek to compel CSS to “change its religious beliefs about 
same-sex marriage”155 or dictate its speech; rather, “if an organization chooses to bid for a foster-
care contract, it must offer services equally to all.”156  
Some religious amici asserted that contended that the non-discrimination policy protects 
religious freedom, since without it, “would-be foster parents could face governmental 
discrimination for their religious beliefs.”157 Such amici also warned that if city governments 
“are told that they may not contract out a social program without losing the ability to ensure the 
program adheres to public policy, many such governments may well decide to simply perform 
these services themselves through public employees.”158 While “[s]uch a decision would be 
                                                          
151 Brief for Lawrence G. Sager, supra note 122, at 11. 
152 See, e.g., Brief for 27 Lay Roman Caths., supra note 132, at 7; Brief for Miguel Díaz, Ambassador to Holy See, 
Ret. et al., supra note 122, at 5; Brief for Church-State Scholars, supra note 132, at 18; Brief for Scholars Who 
Study LGB Population, supra note 142, at 23; Brief for Fam. Equal. & PFLAG Nat’l, supra note 136, at 2. 
153 Brief for Mass. et al., supra note 131, at 4. 
154 Id. at 14. 
155 Brief of Lee C. Bollinger et al, at 17. 
156 Brief for Mass. et al., supra note 131, at 11. 
157 Brief of Baptist Joint Committee et al., supra note 134, at 17. 
158 Id. at 20. 
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perfectly constitutional,” it would hinder rather than further religious liberty: there would be 
“fewer opportunities for participation in some kinds of religiously meaningful work,” such as 
“helping the City recruit and support stable families to temporarily care for abused and neglected 
children in the City’s custody.”159 This argument resonates with reasoning behind the faith-based 
initiative: enlist religious and community actors to address difficult social problems. 
This sampling of the extensive argumentation over the significance of the contract 
between the City and CSS offers a basic picture of how private actors take on certain obligations 
and limitations when they enter the public space and carry out public purposes. As one religious 
amici put it: “There is no free exercise right to extract a subsidy for religious work in a 
government program that contravenes the City’s own, democratically determined conception of 
the public interest.”160 
Part V. The Supreme Court (Partial) Resolution and Open Questions 
The Supreme Court, in its 9-0 ruling, left many of the issues percolating in the Fulton 
case unresolved. For example, while several justices pressed CSS and the Solicitor General on 
the race analogy at oral argument, asking whether a ruling for CSS would also permit a refusal of 
service based on objection to interracial marriage,161 the Chief Justice’s narrow ruling put to the 
side questions about line-drawing between permissible and impermissible exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws. As I have argued elsewhere, this evident unanimity does not indicate a 
“center” that will hold with respect to instances in which religious liberty is in evident conflict 
                                                          
159 Id. at 20. 
160 Brief of Baptist Joint Committee et al., supra note 134, at 21. 
161 Linda McClain,  The Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Oral Argument: Interracial Marriage as a Constitutional 
Lodestar—or Third Rail—in Reasoning about Religiously-Motivated Discrimination, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 17, 
2020), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-oral.html. 
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with LGBTQ rights.162  Perhaps Roberts wrote such a narrow opinion to appear nonpartisan or 
consensus-building. Perhaps he did so to gain the votes of the three liberals— Justice Kagan, 
Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor. They, in turn, may have taken a pragmatic approach in 
joining Roberts’s narrow opinion, rather than dissenting from a broader opinion less protective of 
LGBTQ rights, and of antidiscrimination law more generally. Certainly, all three, at oral 
argument, raised questions about the scope of a religious exemption for government contractors, 
for example, who believed that men and women should be seated separately in public 
transportation.163 Given that, on the current Court, there are no longer four liberal justices to ally 
with a moderate or conservative to form a 5-4 majority in favor of LGBTQ rights, a ruling in 
favor of Philadelphia was very unlikely. Thus, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor may have been 
seeking to limit the damage.  
The apparent unanimity conceals considerable disagreement among the justices, not only 
about whether to overrule Smith, but also over the constitutional landscape formed by Obergefell 
and Masterpiece Cakeshop. For example, in his lengthy concurrence (joined by Justices Gorsuch 
and Thomas), Justice Alito argued that keeping Smith “leaves religious liberty in a confused and 
vulnerable state.”164  Notably, it is only in Justice Alito’s Fulton concurrence that any rhetoric of 
bigotry occurs.  Alito writes: “Suppressing speech—or religious practice—simply because it 
expresses an idea that some find hurtful is a zero-sum game. While CSS’s ideas about marriage 
are likely to be objectionable to same-sex couples, lumping those who hold traditional beliefs 
                                                          
162 My analysis here draws on Linda C. McClain, Fulton: Is There a “Center” to Hold in the Supreme Court’s 
Religious Liberty/LGBTQ Rights Jurisprudence?, BERKLEY FORUM (Jul. 26, 2021), 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/is-there-a-center-to-hold-in-supreme-court-jurisprudence-on-
religious-liberty-and-lgbtq-rights. 
163 McClain,  The Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Oral Argument, supra note 162 (reporting Breyer’s question). 
164 Fulton, slip op. at 77. 
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about marriage together with racial bigots is insulting to those who retain such beliefs.” Alito 
quotes both from Obergefell’s majority opinion and from Masterpiece Cakeshop to insist that 
“traditional beliefs about marriage” are “decent and honorable” and should not be equated with 
“racism, which is neither.”165 Alito’s rhetoric of bigotry in Fulton  suggests continuing 
opposition to Obergefell because of its impact on religious liberty, even as he enlists Obergefell 
to defend religious liberty.166   
Roberts’ Fulton opinion also left for future cases how best to understand how 
commitments to  civility, tolerance, and pluralism, along with equality and nondiscrimination, 
should apply in conflicts like that at issue with CSS’s contract with the City of Philadelphia. 
Thus, some immediate sharply contrasting reactions to Fulton were that the “Supreme Court 
sides with religious bigotry” and that it “upholds civic pluralism for our diverse society.”167 I 
have suggested that the Fulton conflict has reverberations with earlier debates over the faith-
based initiative and the constitutional parameters of public-private partnerships. Perhaps the 
latest instantiation of that initiative, under the Biden/Harris Administration, will offer insights 
about how to “strengthen pluralism and respect constitutional guarantees” while pursuing 
government-civil society partnerships to pursue valuable ends like combating systemic racism, 
addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasing “opportunity and mobility for historically 
disadvantaged communities.”168  At the same time, hyperpartisanship and polarization makes it 
difficult to offer nuanced approaches to such conflicts. Further, because of the issues that Chief 
                                                          
165 Id. at 75. 
166 In a public speech to the Federalist Society, Alito reportedly commented: “You can’t say that marriage is the 
union between one man and one woman. Until very recently, that’s what the vast majority of Americans thought. 
Now it’s considered bigotry.” 
167 Compare Lacy Crawford, Jr., Press Release: Supreme Court Sides with Religion Bigotry in Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW (Jun. 17, 2021) with  Stanley Carlson-Thies, 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia: Supreme Court Upholds Civic Pluralism for Our Diverse Society, INSTITUTIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ALLIANCE (Jun. 29, 2021). 
168 Fact Sheet, supra note 70. 
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Justice Roberts left unresolved, resolutions are more likely to come in the executive and 
legislative arena than in the Court.   Encouragingly, the climate for LBGTQ equality is far better 
under the current federal administration of Biden/Harris, than under Trump/Pence; there are also 
encouraging developments in Congress. At the state and municipal level, however, the U.S. is a 
checkerboard of red and blue and 2021. Some cities and states expressly prohibit discrimination 
against LGBTQ persons by agencies contracting with government to provide social services 
based on religious beliefs, while some permit it; some have no explicit protections of LGBTQ 
persons against discrimination at all.169  Further, there has been an alarming number of proposed 
and enacted laws targeting transgender persons. The full implications of Fulton for this 
checkerboard remain to be seen. The struggle for liberty and equality will continue to be pursued 




                                                          
169 For a map of current state laws, including foster care and adoption laws, see Snapshot: LGBTQ Equality By 
State, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps. 
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